Non-evidential believing and permissivism about evidence : A reply to Dan-Johan Eklund by Cockayne, Joshua et al.
	



	


	
	


	

	
				


 
!∀#
∀∃∀%&

∋(()∗+)(∗+,−∀.
	
∀%/∀
01
∀2	
!3		0∀#&)−4
(	1∋
001
	2!	
%(#
∃∋
3	(
533467∗(∗8
	
	
	


	9	

				

Non-evidential believing and permissivism about evidence: A reply to 
Dan-Johan Eklund 
 
JOSHUA COCKAYNE 
Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK 
jlc513@york.ac.uk 
 
DAVID EFIRD 
Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK 
david.efird@york.ac.uk 
 
DANIEL MOLTO 
Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK 
dm639@york.ac.uk 
 
RICHARD TAMBURRO 
Westside School of Theology, 10500 SW Nimbus Ave, Portland, OR 97140, USA 
richardtamburro@gmail.com 
 
JACK WARMAN 
Department of Philosophy, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, UK 
jrw525@york.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract: In response to John Bishop’s (2007) account of passionally caused 
believing, Dan-Johan Eklund (2014) argues that conscious non-evidential believing is 
(conceptually) impossible, that is, it’s (conceptually) impossible consciously to 
believe that p whilst acknowledging that the relevant evidence doesn’t support p’s 
being true, for it conflicts with belief being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. 
In this paper, we present Eklund’s case against Bishop’s account of passionally 
caused believing, and we argue that it’s unpersuasive, at least to those who accept 
permissivism about evidence, that is, that it’s possible for there to be more than one 
rational response to a given body of evidence. We do this through a novel 
application of a case of nurtured belief, that is, of a person holding a belief simply 
because she was caused to do so by her upbringing, and we use it to show exactly 
where Eklund’s argument goes wrong. We conclude by drawing a general lesson 
drawn from this debate: if permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being 
truth-oriented is consistent with non-evidential believing being possible. 
 
 
How could a person believe something without also believing that the evidence 
conclusively supports it? When the evidence is ambiguous and the belief is 
passionally caused, or so answers John Bishop (2007). Building on William James’s 
remarks, 
 
Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds. For to say, under such circumstances, “Do not decide, but leave 
the question open,” is itself a passional decision—just like deciding yes or no—and is 
attended with the same risk of losing the truth. ((1897/2011), 164; emphasis in the 
original) 
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Bishop argues that non-evidential believing is psychologically possible because  
 
[t]he responsive attitude of holding a proposition true may be elicited by 
causes other than the believer’s recognition, as such, of evidence for the belief’s 
truth under the evidential practice assumed to be applicable (which, in the 
limiting case of a belief which that practice counts as properly basic, amounts 
simply to finding its truth basically evident in experience). ((2007), 114; 
emphasis in the original) 
 
Adopting James’s terminology, he takes these non-evidential causes to be passional 
causes, such as emotions, wishes, desires, affections, affiliations, and so on ((2007, 
114-115).  
To make the James/Bishop account of passionally caused believing in cases of 
evidential ambiguity vivid, consider the following example.  
 
COMMUNITY: You grow up in a religious community. Everyone you know 
believes that God exists. You, too, believe that God exists, but it’s not a belief 
you’ve consciously acquired, that is, you never sat down and asked yourself, 
‘Does God exist?’ Rather, believing that God exists is just part of the culture 
you’re a part of, and it’s also a big part of your life: you go to church, say your 
prayers, and help out at the homeless shelter because you think that’s what 
God wants you to do. In school, you study Aquinas’s Five Ways and think 
they’re pretty good arguments, and you study the problem of evil and think 
it’s not such a problem after all. You then go to university and find out that a 
lot of people don’t believe that God exists and think Aquinas’s Five Ways 
aren’t such good arguments and the problem of evil is a big problem. For the 
first time, you sit down and ask yourself, ‘Does God really exist?’ You come to 
think that the only reason you’ve (unconsciously) believed that he does, and 
found the arguments for his existence compelling and the arguments against 
his existence not compelling, is that you were born and raised in a particular 
community, with a particular culture and set of values; it could easily have 
been, you think, that you were born into an atheistic community, in which 
case you wouldn’t have believed that God exists, wouldn’t have gone to 
church, and wouldn’t have said your prayers, though you think you would 
have helped out at the homeless shelter because that’s still a good thing to do. 
With this thought in mind, you look at the evidence for and against God’s 
existence, trying to see it from both sides, and find it to be inconclusive, that 
is, it leaves it open as to whether God exists or not, in the sense that it renders 
neither God’s existence nor non-existence significantly more probable than 
not. You also find the evidence to be ambiguous, that is, it is open to two 
viable, competing interpretations, one on which God exists and the other on 
which he doesn’t. In short, the evidence for God’s existence is undecidable. 
What should you (consciously) believe now?i 
 
Now Bishop observes that  
 
lack of evidential support for a proposition’s truth does tend, once we become 
aware of it, to undermine any inclination we may have had to hold the 
proposition true—and that general tendency is no doubt central to proper 
cognitive functioning. To take that tendency for a universal psychological 
law, however, would be a rationalist fantasy—plausibly itself an example of 
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passionally believing that things are as one thinks they ought to be! ((2007), 
115; emphasis in the original) 
 
So too, in the case of COMMUNITY, some may come to reduce their confidence in, 
or even to reject, the proposition that God exists. Others, though, may not. They 
may, rather, come to sustain consciously their belief that God exists and their 
confidence-level in that belief. This will be due, no doubt, to their character and 
temperament, formed in their upbringing, which, once influenced their 
unconsciously acquiring a belief that God exists, now influence their consciously 
sustaining that belief. All this, according to Bishop, is right and proper. For, as he 
writes,  
 
To consciously believe that p, for some proposition p, is indeed to find oneself 
with the attitude towards p that it is true; but to find oneself with the attitude 
towards p that it is true is only typically but not necessarily to find p’s truth 
evident or evidentially supported. To believe is, indeed, to believe true; it is not 
necessarily to believe evident. ((2007), 115; emphasis in the original) 
 
Thus, because conscious believing does not require believing evident, non-
evidential, conscious, passionally caused believing is possible.  
 According to Dan-Johan Eklund (2014), this account is conceptually confused. 
It’s impossible, he thinks, to sustain consciously a passionally caused belief whilst at 
the same time believing that evidence to be undecidable, for it conflicts with belief 
being a truth-oriented attitude, or so he argues. In what follows, we present Eklund’s 
case against Bishop’s account of passionally caused believing, and we argue that it’s 
unpersuasive, at least to those who accept permissivism about evidence, that is, that 
it’s possible for there to be more than one rational response to a given body of 
evidence. We conclude by drawing a general lesson drawn from this debate: if 
permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being truth-oriented is consistent 
with non-evidential believing being possible. 
 
Eklund’s argument that non-evidential believing is impossible 
Now, Eklund doesn’t doubt that beliefs can be acquired unconsciously by passional 
causes, as in the COMMUNITY case. However, he does doubt that once that belief 
becomes conscious, it can be sustained. So, for Eklund, in the COMMUNITY case, 
you should, or even must, as a conceptual point, be (consciously) agnostic, since you 
(consciously) think that the evidence doesn’t tell in favour of either theism or 
atheism.  
 Building on a discussion between Bishop (2005) and Andrei Buckareff (2005), 
Eklund argues that the central problem for Bishop’s account is that if (conscious) 
believing is believing true, as Bishop maintains, then ‘consciously believing that p for 
non-truth-related, passional reasons is conceptually troubling’ ((2014), 314). Thus, 
according to Eklund, consciously believing requires believing evident, in which case 
sustaining a non-evidential, passionally caused belief consciously isn’t possible. He 
sums up his argument for this claim as follows: 
 
Suppose that my evidence for p is inconclusive and that I have in less than full 
consciousness acquired the belief that p by a passional cause. Suppose then 
that I happen to reflect consciously [on] this passionally caused belief. But 
now I see that I believe irrespective of what seems to me to be the truth of p, 
since I acknowledge that passional causes do not indicate that p is true and 
that my evidence for p’s truth is inconclusive. But believing irrespective of 
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what seems to be the case is inconsistent with belief’s truth-oriented nature, 
and this is something I also realize. Thus, I do not and cannot believe that p 
anymore. So, consciously to sustain passionally caused belief is not only 
psychologically peculiar, but it involves a conceptual inconsistency. ((2014, 
315-316) 
 
In order to evaluate the argument, we’ll take a concrete example of it, reconstructing 
it and applying it to the COMMUNITY case:  
 
1. For reductio, say that, in the COMMUNITY case, after reflection, you come to 
believe consciously that God exists, sustaining that belief acquired 
unconsciously during your upbringing, even though you now think that the 
evidence for God’s existence is undecidable, that is, it is both inconclusive and 
ambiguous. 
2. If you consciously believe that God exists and, at the same time, believe that 
the evidence for God’s existence is undecidable, then you consciously believe 
that God exists irrespective of whether it seems to you that God exists. 
3. But if you believe that God exists irrespective of whether it seems to you that 
God exists, then you’re believing that God exists irrespective of whether you 
believe it’s true that God exists. 
4. Since, belief is truth-oriented, that is, believing requires believing true, it’s 
impossible to believe that God exists irrespective of whether you believe it’s 
true that God exists. 
5. So, in the COMMUNITY case, you can’t come to believe consciously that God 
exists and, at the same time, think the evidence for God’s existence is 
undecidable. 
 
In what follows, we argue that premise (2) is false.ii To do that, we have to discuss 
first permissivism about evidence, in general, and Bishop’s particular instance of it, 
namely, his ‘thesis of the evidential ambiguity of theism’, or ‘the ambiguity thesis’, 
for short ((2007), 70). 
 
Permissivism about evidence and non-evidential believing 
Permissivism about evidence is the view that there is more than one way to respond 
rationally to a given body of evidence.iii Bishop assumes a particular version of this 
view in his ambiguity thesis, as we term it, according to which 
 
the evidence [for the classical theistic God] is ‘open’ in the sense that it neither 
shows the truth of the claim that God exists nor the truth of its denial to be 
significantly more probable than not. The thesis further describes this 
situation of open evidence as ‘ambiguity’ by making the claim that the total 
available evidence is systematically open to two viable competing 
interpretations—in a sense of ‘viable’ that is hard to make fully precise, but 
may be compared by analogy to the sense in which the drawing of the duck-
rabbit is open to two viable perceptual Gestalts. ((2007), 71) 
 
As evidence for the ambiguity thesis, Bishop observes that equally intelligent, well-
informed people continue to debate, after many centuries, whether the evidence 
does or doesn’t support God’s (non)existence, and he also proposes that the familiar 
arguments for and against God’s existence suffer from epistemic circularity. Now, 
we take permissivism about evidence, in general, and the ambiguity thesis, in 
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particular, to be plausible. But we won’t argue for these claims, for that would take 
us too far afield. Rather, we will argue that, if they are true, premise (2) is false. 
If permissivism about evidence is true, then there are permissive cases, that is, 
cases where there’s more than one way to respond rationally to a given body of 
evidence. If the ambiguity thesis is true, the COMMUNITY case is one such case. 
Now, in the COMMUNITY case, when you were growing up, not only did you 
acquire unconsciously your belief that God exists, but also you acquired your 
standards for reasoning, weighing evidence, and making judgements, where (i) 
belief that God exists is consistent with those standards and (ii) finding the 
arguments for God’s existence compelling and objections to his existence not 
compelling are consistent with that way of reasoning, weighing evidence, and 
making judgements. Consequently, your unconscious judgement that God exists is 
rational relative to those standards for reasoning and weighing evidence.iv   
In metaphorical terms, you have a way of seeing the world, given to you by 
these standards of reasoning, weighing evidence, and making judgements, which 
you acquired unconsciously, and the (unconscious) judgement that results is how 
the world (unconsciously) seems to you, in this case, that God exists. You then 
encounter others who don’t see the world in the same way that you do, that is, they 
have different standards for reasoning weighing evidence, and making judgements, 
and on that way of seeing the world, it seems to them that God doesn’t exist. You 
now see that there are two ways of seeing the world and two ways the world could 
seem, two perceptual Gestalts, as it were. Considering the others’ way of seeing the 
world and how the world seems to them alongside your way of seeing the world 
and how the world seems to you, it seems to you that these two ways of seeing and 
how the world could seem seem equally reasonable. Now, following this encounter, 
you will either continue to see the world in the same way as you did before the 
encounter, and the world will seem the same to you as it did then, that is, that God 
exists, or you will come to see the world in a new way where the world seems 
different to you than it did before the encounter, that is, that God doesn’t exist. In 
either case, premise (2) of Eklund’s argument is false. For convenience, say that you 
continue to see the world in the same way as you did before the encounter: 
 
• You consciously believe that God exists, and, at the same time, you believe 
that the evidence for God’s existence is undecidable. 
• But it’s not the case that you consciously believe that God exists 
irrespective of whether it seems to you that God exists, for it does seem to 
you that God exists based on how you see the world, that is, your 
standards of reasoning, weighing evidence, and making judgements about 
the world.  
 
A general moral can be drawn from the above debate. To summarize: Both Bishop 
and Eklund agree that belief is truth-oriented. Where they disagree is over whether 
non-evidential believing is possible. Our reconstruction of Eklund’s argument 
against Bishop and our reply on behalf of Bishop shows that Bishop can maintain 
both belief being truth-oriented and the possibility of non-evidential believing by 
relying on his ambiguity thesis, or, more generally, that permissivism about 
evidence is true. Thus, generalizing from the Bishop/Eklund debate, we can see that, 
if permissivism about evidence is true, then belief being truth-oriented is consistent 
with non-evidential believing being possible.  
 
Passionally caused believing and doxastic voluntarism 
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Perhaps the strongest objection to our way of reconciling belief being truth-oriented 
with non-evidential believing is that it relies on doxastic voluntarism. In essence, 
that permissivism about evidence entails that it’s possible consciously to decide to 
believe, or not to believe, some proposition. Since it’s plainly obvious to some, 
including both Bishop and Eklund, that beliefs can’t be directly willed, it’s important 
to show how our account isn’t committed to doxastic voluntarism. 
To begin, it’s worth noting that some of the arguments against doxastic 
voluntarism turn on a conceptual connection between something being under some 
sort of rational control and its being caused by factors that logically connect the 
world and the content of the belief. However, this causal analysis will be resisted by 
some, especially those inclined to think that reasons aren’t causes (see, for example, 
(Alvarez (2010)). Commitment to this connection will thus rule some forms of 
doxastic voluntarism out of court from the outset, and exploration of non-causal 
analyses of action (especially decision) in the context of belief formation may open 
up possibilities for doxastic voluntarism, wherein willing is not a causal notion, that 
are immune to the kinds of attack proposed by Eklund.  
 Nevertheless, there are some reasons to suspect that James’s thesis, as it’s 
postulated in ‘The Will to Believe’ (1897/2011), assumes the possibility of some form 
of doxastic voluntarism. What begins to generate the problem in James’s account is 
the ambiguity of the word ‘decide’ in his defence of passionally caused beliefs. In 
one sense, ‘decide’ means the involuntaristic ‘determine’ and, in another sense, it 
means the voluntaristic ‘choose’. On our reading of James, our passional natures 
operate involuntarily and determine, say, our faith-beliefs; following this 
determination, we then choose whether or not to act on these beliefs in our practical 
reason. One reading of what James means by ‘deciding to believe’, then, is that we 
decide (voluntarily) to use our faith-beliefs, determined (involuntarily), in part, by 
our passional natures, in practical reason. Now, it’s clear that James’s account, at 
least on our reading, isn’t committed to doxastic voluntarism, since, on his account, 
we’re not choosing to believe anything, just choosing whether or not to act on our 
belief, which may have been determined by our passional natures. We may have 
some control over our passional natures, though, if we choose to develop them in 
one way or other other, e.g. by going to church, but that sort of indirect doxastic 
voluntarism isn’t what’s up for discussion here. Bishop then goes on to develop 
James’s account in his own work, which we now argue that it, too, doesn’t depend 
on doxastic voluntarism. 
 According to Bishop, in explaining the nature of belief, it’s important to make 
the distinction between ‘holding true’ and ‘taking to be true’ ((2007), 33). Beliefs, 
Bishop maintains, are responsive attitudes towards propositions which ‘are neither 
formed nor revised under the direct control of the will’ ((2007), 30); or in other 
words, Bishop explicitly rejects doxastic voluntarism. He does however, admit that 
there is some level of doxastic control that a believer can have over her beliefs. 
Believing involves, Bishop thinks, both ‘holding true and taking to be true in reasoning’ 
(2007, 34, emphasis in the original). To consider the difference between these two 
aspects of belief, consider his example: 
 
Mary believes her pet tortoise is liable to roam, so, while she shows it off to 
her guests during tea on the lawn, she keeps a wary eye on it so as to avoid 
lengthy searching in the undergrowth at the bottom of the garden…Here 
Mary holds true the proposition that her tortoise can hide itself surprisingly 
quickly, and—now that she has set her tortoise at large—this belief becomes 
salient given her intention not to lose it. Through an effortless piece of 
practical reasoning in which, inter alia, she takes this proposition about the 
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tortoise to be true there results Mary’s action in keeping a close eye on it. 
(2007, 34, emphasis in the original) 
 
Taking to be true and holding true are closely connected—Mary only takes her belief 
to be true in her practical reasoning because she holds the belief to be true. On the 
one hand, holding to be true is a state towards a relevant proposition which is not 
under the direct control of the will—Mary cannot force herself to believe that 
tortoises are not liable to roam, for example. On the other hand, however, taking a 
proposition to be true is a mental event which requires deliberative reasoning. It’s 
possible in some circumstances, Bishop thinks, voluntarily to do otherwise than to 
take a belief to be true even when we already hold it true. For example, I might be 
convinced that a certain piece of medical advice is correct, whilst in practice, I refuse 
to follow this advice, or I might simply ‘hedge my bets’ regarding it (Bishop (2007), 
37). So whilst it’s impossible to will to hold a proposition to be true (the rejection of 
doxastic voluntarism), in some cases, it’s up to us what we do with those beliefs 
which we hold to be true. 
To return to our argument, it might seem that we invoke some form of 
doxastic voluntarism when we say, 
 
Considering the others’ way of seeing the world and how the world seems to 
them alongside your way of seeing the world and how the world seems to 
you, it seems to you that these two ways of seeing and how the world could 
seem seem equally reasonable. Now, following this encounter, you will either 
continue to see the world in the same way as you did before the encounter, 
and the world will seem the same to you as it did then, that is, that God exists, 
or you will come to see the world in a new way where the world seems 
different to you than it did before the encounter, that is, that God doesn’t 
exist. 
 
But this isn’t the case. Neither Bishop nor we are committed to the view that 
continuing to see the world in the same way as you did before the encounter or 
coming to see the world in a new way is a voluntary matter, though you may be 
aware that you have non-voluntarily come to see the world in a particular way. 
Rather, in order to take a proposition to be true, it’s necessary that you already have 
the appropriate motivations (i.e. that you already hold the proposition true). Based 
on your motivations, you will maintain your current standards for reasoning 
weighing evidence, and making judgements that sustain your belief, or you will 
come to have different ones that reject it. And, since we already know that this is a 
case in which the evidence is ambiguous, these motivations can only be passional. 
Taking a belief to be true, then, is not a ‘wilful leap’, Bishop argues, but ‘a motivated 
choice to take to be true what one holds through causes that one recognizes oneself 
to be non-evidential’ ((2007), 117).   
Given that you already believe, based on passional causes, adopting 
standards that would sustain your belief emphatically doesn’t then amount to self-
induced believing, for you already do believe (Bishop (2007), 117). Rather, the 
question is: given that the evidence is ambiguous, are you motivated to sustain your 
belief or not? The important point, then, is that it’s perfectly possible to continue 
operating, now consciously, with the standards of reasoning, weighing evidence, 
and making judgements that you acquired unconsciously when you were growing 
up on which God exists. And so it’s perfectly possible to sustain consciously (or take 
to be true, to use Bishop’s terminology) your unconsciously acquired, passionally 
caused belief that God exists, whilst at the same time believing the evidence to be 
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undecidable. In such a case, it does seem to you that God exists, because that’s the 
way you’re motivated to see the world, metaphorically speaking. That is, you are 
motivated to sustain your belief. To use Bishop’s duck-rabbit example, your 
motivations have resulted in your seeing a rabbit (i.e. believing that God exists), 
even though you’re perfectly aware that you could be seeing a duck (i.e. believing 
that God doesn’t exist), and that others do so, as a result of their own motivations. 
Thus, if the ambiguity thesis is true, premise (2) in the reconstructed form of 
Eklund’s argument is false, since it does seem to you that God exists, even though 
you acknowledge that the evidence is undecidable.v  
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
i This is an adapted and expanded version of Miriam Schoenfield’s case she calls 
‘COMMUNITY’ ((2014), 205). 
ii We note one reply we won’t be pursing against this argument, namely, that it’s 
question-begging. For, as Bishop notes ((2007), 194-196), though passional causes 
typically aren’t indicators of truth, in some circumstances, such as when the 
evidence is undecidable, it may be a matter of debate whether they are or not. In 
contrast, Eklund seems to hold that seemingly passional grounds, on scrutiny, are 
really evidential grounds of belief ((2014), footnote 22). Sidestepping this debate, we 
intend to pursue a different line of response, namely, one that illuminates the 
relationships among truth, evidence, and belief. 
iii For an excellent discussion of permissivism about evidence, along with further 
references, see (Schoenfield (2014)). 
iv Here we adapt an argument from (Schoenfield (2014), 205-206). 
v It’s noteworthy that the relation between the evidence (along with other factors 
contributing to belief formation) and the content of our beliefs is characterised in 
rather black and white terms. In the COMMUNITY case, having encountered and 
assessed a broader range of evidence the agent is faced with a choice of epistemic 
commitment, or a suspension of commitment. However, it can be argued that these 
two statuses represent extremes on the spectrum of attitudes we may possess. The 
agent’s encounter with the evidence may lead them to hold their belief less firmly, 
but not to become agnostic (nor to believe ‘blindly’). We surely do hold beliefs more 
or less firmly, sometimes because of evidence we encounter, and sometimes because 
of how we ‘feel’ about the belief, and what is at stake in its adoption. Uncertainty 
need not imply agnosticism. Incorporating this feature into the analysis would 
enrich the discussion of Bishop et al., and may open up room for an interesting 
response to the problems raised, but that is beyond the scope of this response. 
